Public Responses to Anti-Semitism, 1933-1938 (Part B)
Source: David Bankier, Chapter 4 in: The Germans and the Final Solution , Public Opinion under Nazism, Oxford 1992, pp.67-88.
If the population criticised the anti-Semitic policy because it feared retaliation in the form of an anti-German boycott organised by Jews abroad, or because it was anxious about the possible damage to Germany's prestige, it was all the more alarmed with it directly. An array of reports mention people, who approved anti-Semitism in principle but, afraid of its consequences for themselves, criticised its application. A case in point is a Gestapo report from Koesslin. The writer had his finger on the pulse of the public mood when he wrote that the local population was indeed anti-Semitic but did not want to be harmed by anti-Jewish policy 33 . Many of those objecting had good reasons to worry. They were alarmed that the violence initiated by party activists would spread to those Germans depicted as targets in the surging tide of propaganda. This included the Catholic Church as well as anyone who maintained social or economic contact with Jews or was suspected of such. The feelings of insecurity generated by unbridled denunciations became especially intense towards the summer. Small wonder, then, that those Germans who feared that they might be casualties of the anti-Semitic drive asked party leaders to retard the implementation of anti-Jewish policy. How far practical interests outweighed loyalty to Nazi doctrine can be clearly seen in a report from Koblenz for August and September 1935. A town in the district requested a reduction in the pressure on the Jews. The reason cited was that anti-Semitism did not pay: the inhabitants made their living from a medical institution owned by Jews, and its closure would deprive many family heads of an income 34 .
What effect did these attitudes have on the Nazi authorities? There is no doubt that they were taken very seriously. Some commentators mention local decisions to discontinue violent anti-Jewish methods because they had antagonised the public. The Bielefeld Gestapo, for example, realised that the anti-Semitic campaign had become counterproductive when outrages made the victims into martyrs, and Germans, instead of keeping away from Jews, felt sorry for them. In view of this, it decided to set a limit to anti-Semitic outbursts 35 . It seems, then, that the exile periodical Weltbuehne was not far from the truth when it stated that the attacks on the Jews lessened at the end of May to diminish political disaffection 36 .
With this background in mind, we can analyse the reactions of the German public to the Nuremberg Laws.
Reactions to the Nuremberg Laws
There can be no doubt that the desire of the public for an end to the internal contradictions of the regime's Jewish policy, and the widespread confusion and fear generated by the wave of violent antisemitism, provided an added incentive to push through the Nuremberg Laws. These included two laws that crucially affected the status of German Jews ΓÇô the Reich Citizenship Law and the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour ΓÇô and the law establishing the Swastika banner as the new German flag. This new flag law provides a useful point of reference for our analysis, since the reports convey responses to all three laws. We can thus compare public reactions to the antisemitic legislation, on the one hand, and to the law bringing about a break with Germany's imperial heritage, on the other. In both issues the legislation simply legalised what was already the case: the flag law regularised the fact that the Swastika banner was far more in evidence than the imperial flag; the antisemitic laws created a legal framework that curbed the violence against Jews and Jewish property, which was undermining public order.
Sometimes the Nazi agents do not go into great detail on the responses to the legislation. The report from the Harburg-Wilhelmsburg Gestapo only states that, in relation to the citizenship law and the protection' law, there was no reaction, while the public talked a great deal about the flag law 37 . The actual content of the conversations becomes apparent from reports from other parts of the country. The political police in Munich distinguished sharply between the laws in reporting people's reactions to them. Whereas the population did not express any opinion on the citizenship law, the protection' law produced a positive response. The flag law, however, was openly criticised by officers and war veterans 38 . This was also the assessment of foreign observers. The British consul in Munich noted that the new flag law was beyond doubt universally popular in Bavaria, where the Swastika is known as the circus flag.' 39 From Koblenz we hear of a wider range of public responses: the party congress excited great interest, and the protection' law was received with much approval ΓÇô because, people thought, it would help prevent disturbances and isolate the Jews ΓÇô but the flag law met severe criticism from the older generation 40 .
The different reactions elicited by the three laws show that for the bulk of the German population an assault on a historical symbol such as the blackΓÇôwhiteΓÇôred imperial flag was far more serious than ostracising Jewish fellow citizens. The law annulling Jewish citizenship was not much discussed: it was accepted as an obvious and absolutely natural measure. There was no point in reacting to a law that just rubber-stamped an existing reality. On the other hand, the abolition of the old flag was a matter of public interest and consequently elicited criticism, at least from the older generation.
Let us consider the different reactions to the two laws dealing with the Jews. As to the revocation of Jewish citizenship, the Sopade reporter from Saxony missed the point when he observed that there were no reactions to the law because the German population had other things to worry about 41 . The absence of comment was not a result of indifference to the Jewish question or of simple acceptance that the law, whatever its moral basis, had been enacted by the state and was therefore binding (legal positivism'); it was a silence of tacit consent to the Nazi solution, based on a deep identification with the spirit of the law, which institutionalised the principles of racial separatism by isolating and removing Jews from the Volksgemeinschaft . The Potsdam Gestapo fully captured these feelings. It stated that all believed that with the stabilisation of the regime the time was ripe to realise this item on the party's agenda. At the same time, the commentator added, the public hoped that other points of the Nazi program would be acted upon, especially those related to social issues 42 . In Kiel, too, there was approval of the antisemitic laws, and people expected the status of the churches to be resolved in an equally satisfactory way 43 .
The Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour was especially applauded because it checked antisemitic violence by confining it to the framework of law and order. This law expressed the desire of most Germans to remove the annoyances caused by uncontrolled terror, establishing a legal basis for the policies towards German Jews. The public assumed that the legislation would restore calm to the streets and put an end to behaviour that was besmirching Germany's image as a civilised country. The situation in various districts before and after the laws were adopted fully proves this point.
In August, according to the Bielefeld Gestapo, there was widespread public unrest over cases of Rassenschande (race defilement), leading to popular demands for steps to be taken against it 44 . In its report for September, after the law had been adopted, the same station described the public as content. Everybody hoped that from this point on the Jewish problem would be solved within the framework of the new law and therefore without acts of terror 45 . We hear the same from Berlin. As early as March the Gestapo had noted that the population expected the matter to be settled, and in the summer it indicated that wreally disthe public was the lack of a clear line towards the Jews. In the Gestapo's view, given the abundance of denunciations of race defilement, common police methods were inadequate to prevent the renewal of anti-Jewish riots 46 . These circumstances clarify the reactions to the laws in Berlin. They aroused great enthusiasm everywhere because it was believed that they finally defined the relation between Jews and Germans: Jewry converted into a national minority and gets through state protection the possibility to develop its own cultural and national life.' 47 Similarly in Merseburg the Gestapo station observed that the legislation had won public approval; people expected the restoration of law and order, and, particularly, the scrapping of Der Stuermer 48 . It was only natural for the public to deem Der Stuermer obsolete after the enactment of the protection' law: Streicher's pornographic newspaper, among others, had deliberately provoked antisemitic rioting by spreading libels about race defilement; but, now that discriminatory practices had been legalised and a legal definition of race defilement provided, the excuse for radicals to take the law into their own hands had been removed.
Thus far we have considered the reactions of the population in general. How did the party radicals respond? As discussed above, the reports for July and August touched on the clashed between radicals and the various agencies charged with keeping public order. The extremists' acts of violence did not stop even after Hess and Frick issued restraining directives, which in Berlin and Trier, for example, produced protests from the radicals 49 . The Nuremberg Laws, in their turn, were received by party activists with mixed feelings. The flag law was greeted with jubilation, for it symbolised the victory of party over government. The antisemitic laws were also seen as rekindling the revolutionary flame and thwarting the conservatives. Many saw in their promulgation a ceremonial declaration of antisemitic principles and, as such, a victory for Nazism in realising the party platform. Thus, for example, the report from Kassel recorded the fervent enthusiasm of radical circles: The state is still revolutionary. The party platform has not been forgotten.' 50
Many, however, thought the new laws too moderate', too mild'. Only a few justified this as a political manoeuvre to camouflage antisemitic terror from the outside world 51 . The Dortmund Nazis were more typical, considering the provision allowing the Jews to use their own symbols too great a concession. The author of the Dortmund survey added his opinion that this was liable to bring renewed troubles 52 . Similarly, the Potsdam Gestapo stated that party men deemed the laws too mild. They drew solace from their hopes that the reactions of world Jewry would raise the topic again and consequently sharpen antisemitic policy 53 . The Koblenz district governor reported activists' demand that the clause forbidding the employment by Jews of German maids under the age of forty-five should be extended. In Bielefeld the local Nazis wished that the law had specified no age limit 54 . The criticism of this clause seems to have been quite widespread. Some considered it should have included a ban on the employment of German maids by mixed couples, or by a single Jewish woman 55 .
The reports recorded a few pockets of dissent to the new laws. Some Gestapo agents furnished interesting information on the response of the communist underground to the riots and antisemitic laws. The Dortmund Gestapo, for instance, reported that communist youth had disseminated underground leaflets in Bochum warning of the dangers inherent in the demagogic use of antisemitism among the masses, and calling for a common front between communist, Protestant and Catholic youth. Alongside an appeal for the release of political prisoners, the leaflets asked for tolerance towards the Jews 56 . The sharpest reaction seems to have come from a communist cell in Berlin. The local Gestapo's report for September informs us that the propaganda against antisemitism occupied a prominent place in underground material. Some of the slogans printed by clandestine communists in pamphlets and on stickers are also quoted in the report 57 . It is worth noting, however, that, even though the communists responded vigorously to antisemitic legislation, their basic conceptions of the nature of Nazi antisemitism remained unchanged. As underground publications from this period show, the communists resorted to stereotypical and dogmatic assertions: some stated that only poor workers were arrested for race defilement, while rich Jews were not touched by the Nazis 58 . Others maintained that there were no racial principles behind the ban on keeping maids under forty-five years of age; rather, the clause was simply an excuse for firing thousands of women form their jobs 59 .
The churches had more than once been forced to react to incitement against the Jews, although they actually preferred to avoid this thorny issue altogether. The reports cite a few instances of aversion in church circles to racialist rituals and agitation, and even of protests regarding them; we learn from the Aachen Gestapo that such attitudes were especially prevalent among Catholic priests in the Rhineland 60 . In addition, some Protestants reacted against the regime's racial laws: a report from Speyer tells us that sermons hostile to them were distributed among the public by Evangelical pastors 61 . It is not possible, however, that the motives here were not so much concern for the Jews as anxiety over the status of converts of Jewish origin.
Some misgivings and criticism by the liberal intelligentsia are also recorded. A few opposed the laws on principle, others on pragmatic grounds, mainly out of fear of economic reprisals against Germany. In Potsdam, for example, the better educated worried about an international boycott that would punish Germany for its racial policy 62 .
Finally, some individuals employed by Jews made their feelings known since they feared for their income. Bielefeld Gestapo echoed the apprehensions of German clerks working for Jewish firms: they had reservations about the laws because they were afraid of losing their jobs. The same reaction was heard in Munich: commercial circles believed that Jews abroad would use the laws as an excuse to step up anti-German boycott 63 .
The clause forbidding employment of German women under the age of forty-five upset those directly affected by it. Maids in Koblenz and Hildesheim criticised it as a threat to their livelihood and therefore asked for its revocation or for exemptions in order to retain their work, arguing that otherwise they would become a burden to the public. It is clear that in most of these cases, too, the objections stemmed from self-interest rather than from opposition to discrimination.
To sum up, the vast majority of the population approved of the Nuremberg Laws because they identified with the racialist policy and because a permanent framework of discrimination had been created that would end the reign of terror and set precise limits to antisemitic activities.
The Years 1936 ΓÇô 7
During 1936 and 1937, the whole country experienced a period of relative calm and there was no essential change in public reactions to antisemitic policy. The first half of 1936, when Germany was in the limelight owing to the Olympic Games, was particularly quiet: in order to avoid international controversy, almost no attacks were directed against the Jews in that period, even after the killing of Wilhelm Gustloff, head of the Nazi organisation in Switzerland 65 . Immediately after the games were over, however, the antisemitic agitation started up again, both among local activists and at the party's headquarters. In November 1936, Munich University held a festive opening of the Department for Research into the Jewish Question in the National Institute for the History of the New Germany; Der Stuermer published Der Weltverschwoerer , a special edition prepared for the party congress, which reprinted passages from the Protocols of the Elders oZion, and Stuermer showcases appeared again all over the country 66 . In addition to the renewal of antisemitic propaganda, various governmental agencies issued new regulations and guidelines to increase pressure on the Jews, to force their removal from Germany. The Ministry of Education forbade non-Aryans to teach in private schools and recommended Der Stuermer for religious instructionΓÇÜ Jewish doctors and assistants restricted to working in Jewish hospitals; and the number of arrests for alleged currency offences or race defilement again multiplied.
Were there any changes in the reactions of the population in this period of relative calm? A thorough examination of reports for these years shows that people's moral insensibility to the fate of the Jews became more profound and widespread. This was not necessarily a result of Nazi indoctrination: on the contrary, propaganda continued to bore people, and antisemitic indoctrination evenings were still considered dull and tedious. A socialist observer from Schleswig perceptively noticed the lack of correspondence between responses to antisemitic propaganda and antisemitic attitudes. Although the public had no interest in indoctrination evenings on National Socialist historiography', The race question', Judaism and Freemasonry', and so on, the regime did succeed in driving a wedge between Jews and Germans 67 . This is hardly surprising, for, as we have seen, the bulk of the public did not need Nazi propaganda in order to ostracise Jews. The growing urge to avoid them stemmed from deep-seated anti-Jewish prejudices, and the resulting wide spread approval of segregation. It is true that the Stuermer methods and the violence met with the same disapproval as in the past and remarks condemning the Stuermer showcases appeared in almost every report. Nevertheless, the picture of what the public thought of the Jewish question is totally uniform: the general opinion was that the race laws should be carried out and the Jews removed from posts in administration, science and arts 68 .
It is against this background that the attitudes of educated Germans to the Nazis' antisemitic policy are best viewed. Their criticism of the regime had been aroused by the earlier riots and boycott campaigns, but, once the Nuremberg Laws had been introduced and the violence damped down, total indifference to the fate of the Jews became dominant. The January 1936 Sopade report from Berlin, which examined the influence of antisemitism on the population, asserted that the race question as an ideological issue had not penetrated the consciousness of the educated classes. The incitement of Der Stuermer was seen as a national disgrace and elicited occasional manifestations of pro-Jewish feelings, but otherwise they were not interested in the issue and did not find antisemitism deserving of concern 69 .
Still, even when the Jews were socially segregated, commercial relations with them continued as long as it made economic sense and German customers went to Jewish shops. The peasants in particular were slow to give in. As long as it was possible to deal with Jewish cattle-dealers, peasants traded with them 70 . Again, it has to be emphasised that this fact should not lead to conclusions of sympathy for the Jews. Since most Germans were not fanatically' antisemitic, practical interest outweighed common' anti-Jewish sentiments.
References:
33 Gestapo Koesslin, report Aug. 1935, ibid.
34 RP, report Aug.ΓÇôSep. 1935, BA, R 18/1565.
35 Gestapo Bielefeld,report July 1935, GS, REP/90 P.
36 Die W , 6 June 1935, pp. 726-7.
37 Gestapo HarburgΓÇôWilhelmsburg, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/529.
38 Polizei Direktion Muenchen, report Aug.ΓÇôSep. 1935, BA, R 58/671.
39 British Consul in Munich, 17 Sep. 1935, PRO, FO 371/18880.
40 RP Koblenz, report Aug.ΓÇôSep. 1935, BA, R 18/1565.
41 Sopade, Sep. 1935, A 35 (Sachsen 1).
42 Gestapo Potsdam, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/1591.
43 Ibid.; Gestapo Kiel, report Sep. 1935, YVA, JM/2834; Kulka, Die Nuernberger Rassengesetze', p. 609.
44 Gestapo Bielefeld, report Aug. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; Kershaw, Persecution of the Jews', p. 270; Kulka, ΓÇ¥Public opinionΓÇ¥ ', p. 130.
50 Gestapo Kassel, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/529.
51 Gestapo Potsdam, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/1591.
52 Gestapo Dortmund, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/514.
53 Gestapo Potsdam, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/1591.
54 Gestapo Bielefeld, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/513; RP Koblenz, report Oct.ΓÇôNov. 1935, BA, R 18/1565.
55 Gestapo Koblenz, report Nov. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P.
56 Gestapo Dortmund, report Oct. 1935, BA, R 58/1143.
57 Gestapo Berlin, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/513.
58 Ibid.
59 D. Bankier, The German Communist Party and Nazi Antisemitism, 1933-1938', Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute , 32 (1987), pp. 331-3.
60 Ibid.
61 RP Speyer, report Sep. 1935, BHStA, MA 106677.
62 Gestapo Potsdam, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/1591.
63Gestapo Bielefeld, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/513; RP Oberbayern, report Aug.ΓÇôSep. 1935, BA, R 18/1567.
64 RP Koblenz, report Oct.ΓÇôNov. 1935, BA, R 18/1565; Gestapo Hildesheim, report Oct. 1935, BA, R 58/1144; RP Ansbach, report Oct. 1935, YVA, JM/2858. Other issues, which remained unclear despite the legislation also confused the public: see Gauamt fuer Kommunalpolitik, Magdeburg-Anhalt, 25 Oct. 1935, and Schwabe, 31 Dec. 1935, BA, NS 25/85, fo. 1.
65 RP Ansbach, report Mar. 1936, BHStA, MA 106690.
66 Sopade, Dec. 1936, A 11 (Suedwest). On the renewal of antisemitic and persecutions, but the removal of Jews from the civil service, science, arts, etc. is endorsed by almost everyone' (Sopade, Oct. 1936, A6).
67 Sopade, June 1936, A 62 (Mitteldeutschland); Jan. 1936, A 21 (Berlin 3).
68 The Sopade contact man informed that People condemn violent antisemitism and persecutions, but the removal of Jews from the civil service, science, arts, etc. is endorsed by almost everyone' (Sopade, Oct. 1936, A6).
69 Sopade, Jan. 1936, A 20 (Berlin 2).
70 Kershaw, Popular Opinion , pp. 231-45; S. M. Lowenstein, The struggle for survival of rural Jews in Germany 1933-1938: the case of Bezirksamt Weissenburg, Mittelfranken', in Paucker, Die Juden im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland , pp. 115-24; Wiesemann, Juden auf dem Lande: die wirtschaftliche Ausgrenzung der juedischen Viehhaendler in Bayern', in Detlev Peukert und Juergen Reulecke (eds), Die Reihen fast geschlossen. Alltag im Nationalsozialismus (Hammer, Wuppertal, 1981), pp. 381-96.
